This article is a first attempt to line out the conditions under which executives might have a real self-interest in pursuing a broad stakeholder management (SM) orientation to enlarge their power. We suggest that managers have wider latitude of action under an SM approach, even when this is instrumental to financial performance. The causally ambiguity of the performance effects of idiosyncratic relationships with stakeholders not only makes SM strategy difficult for competitors to imitate but also increases managerial discretion. When managers (...) use this situation for their own benefit, they can undermine the purported goals of the SM approach. By analyzing some of the factors that might lead to such disfunctionalities, this article advances a theory of the potential dark side of SM. (shrink)

We draw on the behavioral agency model to explore the ethical consequences of CEO equity incentives. We argue that CEOs are more concerned with funding pension plans when they have more to gain from their stock options yet will increasingly underfund employee pension funds as their current option wealth increases. Our findings reveal that both effects hold when the CEO has greater power (also occupying board chair) over firm decision making. Our study suggests that there is an ethical dimension to (...) equity incentives, given they are intended to align CEO interests with shareholders, yet potentially incentivize CEO behaviors with adverse consequences for employees. Insights from our findings provide boards and regulators with behavioral levers to protect employee well-being in the context of pension funding. (shrink)

This study draws upon the behavioral agency model and the concept of socioemotional wealth to investigate how family firms’ employee pension underfunding decisions differ from those of non-family firms. We explore how these differences are influenced by financial distress, generational stage, and whether the firm is eponymous. We test our hypotheses using data from 452 US firms over an eleven-year period. Our results suggest that family firms are less likely to underfund pensions, but this effect is attenuated in later generational (...) ownership stages and in non-eponymous firms. (shrink)

We examine the unique nature of agency problems within publicly traded family firms by investigating the earnings management decision of dominant family owners relative to non-family. To do so, we draw upon literature demonstrating that family owners are loss averse with respect to the family’s socioemotional wealth, or the affective endowment derived from firm ownership and control. Our theory and findings suggest that potential reputational consequences of earnings management lead family principals to engage in less of this practice relative to (...) non-family firms, and that founder family firms are less likely than non-founder family firms to use earnings management. Moreover, the family-firm effect varies with the firm size, the degree of CEO entrenchment, and the firm’s stock structure. We provide important insights regarding differences between family and non-family principals in the use of unethical accounting practices, thereby extending agency theory and advancing an underdeveloped research area. (shrink)

Um alinhamento responsável à alguma versão do naturalismo filosófico requer a articulação explicita e cuidadosa de um argumento em sua defesa. Em quatro passos, o texto que segue abaixo expande e examina a validade de um argumento que é frequentemente rascunhado em favor do naturalismo. Como veremos, contudo, a versão do naturalismo que esse argumento nos permite é um pouco diferente dos naturalismos filosóficos mais populares.

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

Hermeneutical injustices, according to Miranda Fricker, are injustices that occur “when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences” (Fricker 2007, 1). For Fricker, the relevant injustice in these cases is the very lack of knowledge and understanding experienced by the subject. In this way, hermeneutical injustices are instances of epistemic injustices, the kind of injustice that “wrongs someone in their capacity as a subject of knowledge” (...) (Fricker 2007, 5). In this paper, however, I identify different means by which our hermeneutic activities lead to social injustices, of both a practical and epistemic kind, and I identify different ways in which those injustices manifest themselves. Since Fricker’s use of the notion of “hermeneutical injustices” to denote a well-defined kind of injustice is rightfully well-established, I here refer to the more general kinds of injustices I have in mind as “hermeneutic injustices” instead. (shrink)

Bidirectional trans‐synaptic signaling is essential for the formation, maturation, and plasticity of synaptic connections. Synaptic cell adhesion molecules (CAMs) are prime drivers in shaping the identities of trans‐synaptic signaling pathways. A series of recent studies provide evidence that diverse presynaptic cell adhesion proteins dictate the regulation of specific synaptic properties in postsynaptic neurons. Focusing on mammalian synaptic CAMs, this article outlines several exemplary cases supporting this notion and highlights how these trans‐synaptic signaling pathways collectively contribute to the specificity and diversity (...) of neural circuit architecture. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

Given plausible assumptions about the nature of evidence and undercutting defeat, many believe that the force of the evidential problem of evil depends on sceptical theism’s being false: if evil is...

The distinction between propositional and doxastic justification has been of undisputed theoretical importance in a wide range of contemporary epistemological debates. Yet there are a host of intimately related issues that have rarely been discussed in connection with this distinction. For instance, the distinction not only applies to an individual’s beliefs, but also to group beliefs and to various other attitudes that both groups and individuals can take: credence, commitment, suspension, faith, and hope. Moreover, discussions of propositional and doxastic justification (...) have rarely focused on broader meta-epistemological issues, and yet meta-epistemological positions can have important implications for first-order views about this distinction. This volume addresses these and other issues by bringing together 16 essays that advance the state-of-the-art thinking on propositional and doxastic justification and explore how such thinking shapes and is shaped by a range of issues previously neglected in contemporary epistemology. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

El siguiente ensayo rastrea las reflexiones de Friedrich Hölderlin en torno a lo mítico. El argumento, expuesto una y otra vez en su correspondencia, sus ensayos y poemas, continuamente refinado y corregido, es que, expresado en lenguaje poético, el mito permite recuperar una visión del mundo fragmentada con el ímpetu analítico finisecular. El concepto de lo mítico de Hölderlin no solo está profundamente influido por el contexto histórico e intelectual en los lindes del Frühromantik, la filosofía de Fichte, la estética (...) de Schiller y la Revoluciónfrancesa como notas principales, sino también por las experiencias de la niñez, las lecturas de los colegios conventuales o los encuentros en Tubinga o Fráncfort. Finalmente, el texto muestra cómo estas indagaciones cristalizan en distintos motivos de su producción lírica. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and (...) Peter van Inwagen). (shrink)

En el artículo se describe el tránsito filosófico-existencial de Tula, protagonista de la novela La tía Tula de Miguel de Unamuno, por los tres estadios vitales del filósofo danés Søren Kierkegaard. A lo largo del texto, se muestra que las dudas existenciales que se plantea la protagonista son extensivas para todo el género humano. Además, el texto busca mostrar cómo la narrativa del pensador español está plagada de reflexiones filosóficas y está fuertemente influida por el existencialismo cristiano de Kierkegaard. Debatiéndose (...) entre la fe y la razón, Tula transita por los estadios tomando decisiones que entrañan sufrimiento. En esta novela, se plasman los afanes del ser humano por la perpetuación, inmortalidad y salvación frente al rostro descarnado de la nada. (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I consider four challenges to three central versions of skeptical theism: (a) the problem of generalized skepticism, (b) the problem of moral skepticism, (c) the problem of unqualified modal skepticism, and (d) the challenge from Bayesian (...) epistemology. (shrink)

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview. Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we (...) find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism. (shrink)

El artículo comienza con una consideración general en torno a la traducción inspirada en las reflexiones de Hans-Georg Gadamer. Se enfatiza el hecho de que la traducción no es simplemente un reflejo especular del texto original sino una sobreiluminación que oscila entre la participación en la cosa que se discute y la traición al sentido traducido. Una segunda sección está dedicada a la obra de Julia Iribarne como traductora de artículos y libros filosóficos. Se subrayan tanto su carácter de experta (...) en lenguas y cuestiones filosóficas como su condición de pensadora original preocupada por los mismos temas que traduce. Por último, se listan brevemente sus traducciones y se ofrece un comentario más detallado de su última gran realización, la traducción de la Crisis de Edmund Husserl, completada en el añoThe paper begins with a general consideration on translation inspired by Hans-Georg Gadamer’s reflections. The fact is stressed that no translation is simply a mirroring of the original text, but rather a highlighting that fluctuates between participation in the subject under discussion and betrayal of the translated sense. A second section is devoted to Julia Iribarne’s work as translator of philosophical papers and books. Her expertise in languages and philosophical issues, as well as her status as an original thinker engaged in the very topics she translates, are underlined. Finally, her translations are briefly listed, and a rather detailed commentary on her last major achievement, the translation of Edmund Husserl’s Crisis completed in 2008, is provided. (shrink)

O ceticismo é por vezes descartado como uma doutrina absurda e merecedora do seu lugar distante na antiguidade. Nada poderia ser menos correto. O ceticismo continua extremamente relevante para o pensamento filosófico e científico de hoje, servindo como um lembrete de que a sabedoria não é barata nem segura. Nesse texto, o meu objetivo principal é reproduzir o raciocínio das discussões clássicas sobre o ceticismo, mas de uma maneira coloquial e contemporânea. Após seguir as linhas de pensamento de Sexto Empírico, (...) René Descartes, e David Hume, eu vou extrair e identificar claramente as teses centrais que marcam as suas ideias. A minha intenção, porém, não é a de sugerir que as suas teses são auto-evidentes, ou incontestáveis, ou até hoje ainda incontestadas. Muito pelo contrário. A minha intenção é produzir um aperitivo ao debate e um convite a discussão. (shrink)

Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, (...) and some of the alleged connections between agency and justification. (shrink)

A new evolutionary concept is presented, based on the principle of biological diversity by organismal adaptation, more specifically the origin of the first variations and the process leading to speciation. The article suggests the mechanism of stimulation as the major promoter of genetic variation, making an overall assessment and accurate to the natural phenomenon responsible for this evolutionary step. Constantly, environmental forces interact with the organism, favoring changes to the organs toward adaptation. Stimulation focuses on this action?reaction between organism and (...) environment, trying to decipher the causes/consequences resulting. The article also addresses possible relationships and constraints with neo-Darwinism. (shrink)

Lynne Baker was a trenchant critic of reductionist and physicalist conceptions of the universe, as well as the foremost defender of the constitution view of human persons. Baker was a staunch defender of a kind of practical realism, or what she sometimes called a metaphysics of everyday life. And it was this general “common sense” philosophical outlook that underwrote her non-reductionist, constitution view of reality. Whereas most of her contemporaries were given to metaphysical reductionism and eliminativism, born of a penchant (...) for so-called Quinean desert landscapes, Baker was unapologetic and philosophically deft in her defense of ontological pluralism. This volume honors Baker’s work by bringing together 16 critical essays by some of her students, colleagues, interlocutors, and friends. The essays fall into four areas, each an area to which Baker made unique and influential contributions: Practical Realism about the Mind, The Constitution View of Human Persons, The First Person Perspective, and God, Christianity and Naturalism. (shrink)

Externalism About Knowledge presents new essays from leading epistemologists working in various branches of this tradition: process reliabilism, tracking views, safety views, virtue epistemology, proper functionalism, naturalized epistemology, and knowledge-first epistemology.

The ability of the medical profession to sustain life, or more appropriately, to prolong dying, in patients with terminal illness, creates a most complex and controversial situation for all involved: the patient, if mentally alert; the patient's family; and the medical care team including physicians, nurses and attendants. This situation is especially complex in large acute care hospitals where medical and nursing students, residents and house officers receive advanced medical training. A major problem, prolonging the dying of the terminally ill, (...) with its medical, legal, ethical and economic complexities now confronts American society. The problem is particularly acute in teaching hospitals, in which one finds a disproportionate number of terminally ill patients. The ability to work at these questions as a community rather than as adversaries will determine much about the ability of the health care system to respect the dignity and autonomy of those who seek aid and comfort when faced with serious illness and impending death. Better communication between the physicians, health care providers, the lawyers and ethicists must be developed in order to solve these problems. Over the next ten years society and our elected representatives will be making very demanding decisions about the use of the health dollar. One possible way to prevent increasing costs is to reach significant agreement on the proper care of the dying. Proper care for the dying is being considered, discussed, and evaluated by very thoughtful people. It is not governments which should decide who is to live or who is to die. There is the serious problem of the 'slippery slope' to euthanasia by omission if cost containment becomes the major force in formulating policy on the proper care of the dying. (shrink)

La Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga, Ica-Perú, debido al Covid 19 se adecuó a la virtualidad implementando el aula virtual Laureasea. Esta investigación se realizó durante el semestre académico 2021-1. Objetivo: analizar de qué manera la educación virtual mejora el desempeño docente. Participaron 430 docentes de las 24 facultades respondiendo una encuesta virtual. Resultados significativos: 80% dictó una clase virtual por primera vez, 60% tenía acceso a una aula virtual, 68% ha mejorado su desempeño y 75% prefiere las clases (...) presenciales. Conclusiones: La educación virtual mejora significativamente el desempeño docente y prefieren el dictado de clases presenciales. (shrink)

This article synthesizes the results of several interviews with argumentation scholars from across the American continents to address three questions regarding the connections in argumentation studies between North and South/Central America: “What motivated the study of argumentation in the Americas?” “What commonalities, if any, exist in argumentation studies across the Americas?” and “What should the future of argumentation studies in the Americas look like?” Using these interviews in combination with existing textual sources, the article also provides motivated suggestions for directions (...) for the future of the community in the field. (shrink)

The use of images in education has received little attention despite the dual role of images in school textbooks, one aimed at the acquisition of knowledge and the other at the transmission of attitudes, values and norms, that constitute a valuable source of historical, educational and communicative research. We will study, through the analysis of content, the characteristics of the catechisms, the legislation of the time related to the publication of school textbooks, the presence of images, types, the didactic function (...) and the transmission of social models and ideology. The research suggests that the images of school catechisms are not simply reflections of a reality that facilitates the learning of the contents taught in schools, but that they also become an effective tool in the transformation of the values and ideological thinking of the social context in which they are produced. (shrink)

Motivation in schizophrenia has been a key research aim for several decades. Motivation is a very complex process underlying negative symptoms that has been assessed and identified using very different instruments and terminologies. This study provides a comprehensive overview of the growing literature production and highlights an extensive set of variables to better understand the study of motivation. Electronic databases were searched in order to compile relevant studies of motivation in individuals with schizophrenia. The initial search identified 3,248 potentially interesting (...) records, and of these, 161 articles published between 1956 and 2017 were finally included. Information such as year of publication, journal, country, and number of authors was codified. Variables related to sample characteristics, methodological aspects, and motivational terms were also extracted. The results revealed a significant growth trend in literature production, especially since the 2000s, with reward as the main term studied. In addition, questionnaires were identified as the preferred instrument to assess motivation in patients with schizophrenia. Other aspects such as country of publication, authors, journals of publication, and co-citation network analysis were also examined. The discussion offers recommendations for future research. (shrink)